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CASE NOTE
MORAL RIGHTS PROTECTION UNDER THE VISUAL
ARTISTS RIGHTS ACT OF 1990: THE JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION IN CARTER V. HELMSLEY-SPEAR
INTRODUCTION
Increased protection of moral rights for American artists has finally come to
fruition with the enactment of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, commonly
known as "VARA".' Signed by President Bush in December of 1990 as an am-
endment to the Copyright Act of 1976,2 VARA is the first federal legislation
created by Congress explicitly recognizing an artist's moral rights. One of the
moral rights protected under VARA is the right of attribution,3 where an author
of a work of visual art has the right to claim the authorship of a particular work,
to prevent his or her name from being attached to a work which he or she did
not create, and to prevent his or her name from being attached to a work that has
been altered. The other moral right protected under VARA is the right of integri-
ty,' where an author has the right to prevent the distortion, mutilation, modifica-
tion, or destruction of a work of visual art. The enactment of this legislation
exemplifies how the embodiment of an artist's personality in his or her work,
and the integrity inherent therein, has gained a greater importance in our society
today.
In the recent ruling of Carter v. Helmsley-Spear,5 the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York became the first federal court to
interpret VARA. This Note seeks to show how the concept of moral rights came
into existence in the United States in its modem form of VARA. More impor-
tantly, the Note will interpret the court's holding in the Carter case to determine
the potential effect that VARA will have on future visual arts cases.
1. The Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990) (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). Although the terms "author" and "artist" are used inter-
changeably throughout this Note, they have the same meaning - a creator of a particular work.
2. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553 (1976) (codified at 17 U.S.C.).'
3. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1) and (2), infra note 43.
4. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3), infra note 43.
It should also be noted that the Carter court's analysis dealt with the right of integrity. This is,
therefore, the major focus of the Note.
5. Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
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I. A HISTORY OF MORAL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES
On March 1, 1989, the United States finally became a member of the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.6 Commonly
known as the Berne Convention, this treaty is the "highest internationally rec-
ognized standard for the protection of works of authorship of all kinds."7 In fact,
the Berne Convention has earned the distinction of being the world's foremost
multilateral copyright treaty, since it is 'the oldest and most comprehensive
international treaty governing the protection of copyrights."8 Therefore, U.S.
accession into the Berne Convention was considered a great advancement for the
United States in its intellectual property relations with other nations of the
world.9
After over one hundred years of debate,"0 the United States decided to join
the Berne Convention for a number of reasons. First, it was in the national inter-
est of the United States to join the Berne Convention because it ensured the U.S.
a formidable presence in the global marketplace." In addition, membership in
6. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988).
Concluded in 1886, the founders of the Berne Convention initially established two fundamental
principles. First, all signatories to the Berne Convention would operate as a single cooperative union.
H.R. REP. No. 609, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1988). The object of creating a single multilateral
copyright treaty was to eliminate the several bilateral copyright treaties to which the European coun-
tries belonged, since these individual treaties were fraught with conditions and formalities. Id. at 11.
Second, each member state would abide by the rule of "national treatment," where an author is grant-
ed in any other member state the same copyright protection for his or her work as that particular
member state accords its own authors. Id. at 12.
In one of the successive revisions of the Berne Convention, specifically in Rome in 1928, the
members of the treaty established another principle under the Berne Convention. This new principle,
under Article 6bis, expressly recognized the moral rights of attribution and integrity. Pursuant to
Article 6bis, authors not only had the right to claim authorship of a work, they also had the right to
object to modifications of the work which prejudiced their honor or reputation. In fact, this express
recognition of moral rights consequently kept the United States from becoming a member of the
Berne Convention for so many years, since copyright law did not comport with the moral rights
provisions stipulated in Article 6bis. See Orrin G. Hatch, Better Late Than Never: The Implementa-
tion of the 1886 Berne Convention, 22 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 171, 175-6 (1989).
7. S. REP. No. 352, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1988).
8. Hatch, supra note 6, at 172.
9. 136 CONG. REc. H8266-02, H8269 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1990).
10. For a history of why the U.S. did not join the Berne Convention for over one hundred years,
see Hatch, supra note 6, at 177-183 (discussing the reasons why historically U.S. copyright law did
not comport with a moral rights doctrine). See also Edward J. Damich, Moral Rights Protection and
Resale Royalties for Visual Art in the United States: Development and Current Status, 12 CARDOZO
ARTs & ENT. Li. 387, 388 (1994) ('The concept that the artist should continue to control the destiny
of his or her work even after it was sold conflicted with the traditional reverence for privacy rights").
In addition, see also Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is An American Mar-
riage Possible?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1, 17 (1985), citing Merryman, The Refrigerator of Bernard
Buffet, 27 HASTINGS LJ. 1023, 1042 (1976) ("Professor Merryman on the other hand, is not surprised
by the 'underdeveloped state' of American law on this subject [of the adoption of a moral right doc-
trine], given that American art only recently achieved international recognition, and that the law
requires time to respond to social and cultural changes.").
11. S. REP. No. 352, supra note 7, at 2.
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the Berne Convention guaranteed the U.S. the ability to participate in the cre-
ation and direction of international copyright policy on a global scale. 2 This is
especially important since any revision of the Berne Convention requires a unani-
mous vote, which the U.S. could prevent, if there is a particular decision detri-
mental to its own interests. 3 Furthermore, joining the Beme Convention also
provided the United States with an opportunity to reduce the impact of wide-
spread international copyright piracy that costs American businesses billions of
dollars every year. 4 Most importantly, adherence to the Berne Convention as-
sured the U.S. of the absolute highest level of protection in those countries that
use American copyrighted works. 5
It would be fair to say that the United States' initial interest in joining the
Berne Convention was strictly economic. This is the case not only for the afore-
mentioned reasons, but especially because of the fact that even after the United
States finally joined the Berne Convention, it was still not willing to expressly
recognize the moral rights of attribution and integrity on a federal level. In fact,
after its accession into the Berne Convention, the United States did not initially
create federal legislation expressly recognizing an artist's moral rights, because
Congress believed that U.S. law sufficiently protected the moral rights mentioned
in Article 6bis 6 through existing federal and state statutes and common law. 7
The strong presence in the global marketplace is important for the U.S. because the U.S. ex-
ports the most copyrighted material in the world. In fact, this leading status enables the U.S. to
achieve a trade surplus regarding copyrighted works. See H.R. Rep. No. 609, supra note 6, at 18
("American popular culture and information products have become precious export commodities of
immense economic value."). Since technological advances allow creative works and ideas to be easily
transmitted anywhere in the world, this stronger presence in the global marketplace ensures the U.S.
of retaining its positive trade balance. Id. at 17.
12. S. REP. No. 352, supra note 7, at 2.
U.S. adherence to Berne could only encourage other countries to also join the Berne Conven-
tion or at least implement greater levels of copyright protection. See H.R. REP. No. 609, supra note
6, at 18. U.S. adherence to the Berne Convention is even more logical since the U.S. has become
"the arts capital of the world." See 136 CONG. REc., supra note 9, at H8271.
13. S. REP. No. 352, supra note 7, at 4.
14. Id. at 2 (In 1986, U.S. companies lost between $43 billion and $61 billion because of the
United States' inadequate legal protection of intellectual property on an international scale). See also
136 CONG. REC., supra note 9, at H8270 (statement of Rep. Moorhead of California, where he testi-
fied that the billions of dollars lost per year are not only suffered by the individual artists, but the
entire country as well due to the effect on the balance of trade).
Piracy has especially increased in recent years due to the technological advances that allow for
simple, unauthorized copying of creative works. See H.R. REP. No. 609, supra note 6, at 17.
15. Copyright protection under the Berne Convention is extended to all countries that are signato-
ries to the treaty, pursuant to the rule of "national treatment." See text accompanying supra note 6.
Thus, by joining the Berne Convention, the U.S. gained formal copyright protection with all of the
existing Berne members, twenty-four of which it has no other type of intellectual property agreements
before Berne. S. REP. No. 352, supra note 7, at 19.
16. Pursuant to the latest revision of the Berne Convention in Paris of 1971, the current form of
Article 6bis provides that:
(I) Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of the said
rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any
distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the
1995]
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However, these causes of action were not satisfactory to fully protect an
artist's moral rights. For example, as a federal statutory cause of action, copy-
right protection under the federal Copyright Act of 1976 was insufficient to
protect moral rights, since the primary objective of the Copyright Act of 1976 is
to protect the pecuniary interests of the person who owns the copyright." Amer-
ican courts have also used substitute legal theories pursuant to state laws, such as
defamation, 9 invasion of privacy,20 and contract law,2' to protect an artist's
said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.
(2) The rights granted to the author in accordance with the preceding paragraph shall, after
his death, be maintained, at least until the expiry of the economic rights, and shall be
exercisable by the persons or institutions authorized by the legislation of the country
where protection is claimed. However, those countries whose legislation, at the moment of
their ratification of or accession to this Act, does not provide for the protection after the
death of the author of all the rights set out in the preceding paragraph may provide that
some of these rights may, after his death, cease to be maintained.
(3) The means of redress for safeguarding the rights granted by this Article shall be gov-
erned by the legislation of the country where protection is claimed.
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as revised in Paris
on July 24, 1971, art. 6bis.
It is important to note that pursuant to paragraph (3) of Article 6bis, the Berne Convention is
not self-executing. In other words, whether the Berne Convention is self-executing in a particular
member country depends on "the constitution of the country in question: in some it becomes part of
the law of the land; in others, parliament must pass laws to give effect to the Convention's obliga-
tions." H.R. REP. No. 609, supra note 6, at 29. Thus, each individual member nation of the Berne
Convention decides whether the treaty is self-executing. Id. at 32.
17. S. REP. No. 352, supra note 7, at 10.
18. Kwall, supra note 10, at 2.
An artist must retain the ownership of the copyright of the work in order to invoke any copy-
right protection at all under the Copyright Act. H.R. REP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1990).
Therefore, once a work is sold, the artist may potentially lose all copyright protection, if the artist
chose not to retain the ownership of the copyright to the work as well. See Kwall, supra note 10, at 2
("The 1976 Act does not purport to protect the creator, but rather the copyright owner."). If the artist
does sell the copyright to the work, then the copyright owner reaps the economic benefits and con-
trols over any alterations, while the author accrues no benefits. For an in-depth analysis of the rela-
tionship between the doctrine of moral rights and the Copyright Act of 1976, prior to the VARA
amendments, see Kwall, supra note 10, at 38-56.
Even with the enactment of VARA, the primary objective of the Copyright Act of 1976 is still
to protect the pecuniary interests of the person who owns the copyright. VARA simply extends moral
rights protection to works of visual art, while still protecting the pecuniary interests of the copyright
owner.
19. As a common law cause of action, the tort of defamation requires an injury to an artist's
professional reputation. Kwall, supra note 10, at 22. The injury to the artist's professional reputation
may occur due to showing an artist's work in a mutilated form, or by falsely attributing authorship to
a work in which the artist was not involved. Id. "The key to any successful defamation action, how-
ever, is the creator's showing that the unauthorized acts exposed him to contempt or public ridicule,
thus injuring his professional standing." Id. Therefore, for a greater chance of success under a defa-
mation action, an artist must already have some existing reputation that could be harmed. See Timo-
thy M. Casey, The Visual Artists Rights Act, 14 HASTNGS CoMM/ENT LJ. 85, 92 (1991). This poten-
tially leaves unknown artists without a remedy under the tort of defamation.
20. Under the invasion of privacy action, the artist may be granted relief based on an injury to
the artist's feelings. Kwall, supra note 10, at 25. An action under invasion of privacy may include
[Vol. V:187
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moral rights. Like the Copyright Act of 1976, these common law causes of ac-
tion have also been proven to be insufficient to protect an artist's moral rights a
Furthermore, eleven states currently have some form of moral rights protection,
generally due to the shortcomings of the common law and the lack of federal
statutory causes of action Although these states have some form of moral
rights protection, they still do not include all of the protections stipulated in the
Berne Convention, and they do not protect artists in all fifty states.24
Therefore, it can be concluded that even though Congress believed federal
statutory law and common law sufficiently protected American artists' moral
rights pursuant to Article 6bis, this was obviously not the case. Common law
causes of action are not possible in all instances; only a minority of states actual-
false attribution, just like in a defamation action. Id. at 23. An invasion of privacy action is especially
unsuccessful for prominent artists. Casey, supra note 19, at 95. Courts generally refuse to extend the
right of privacy to prominent artists since a right of privacy does not easily comport with having "ce-
lebrity status." Id. This greater status tends to increase the bargaining power of the artist, thereby
making contract law a more adequate cause of action. Id. Finally, the right of privacy deals with the
right of attribution rather than the right of integrity which artists also need for protection of their
moral rights. Damich, supra note 10, at 393. The right of integrity, if protected at all in an action, is
only protected coincidentally Id.
21. Contract law is unsatisfactory as a common law cause of action to protect an artist's moral
rights because of the unequal bargaining power between the parties, with the artist most often being
in the weaker position. See Kwall, supra note 10, at 27 ("relatively unknown creators face a disparity
of bargaining power that frequently results in a loss of valuable protections."). In addition, an artist
may not be not be able to recover due to limits the privity requirement may impose. Id. at 26. More-
over, although there is a lack of court enforcement of contract provisions because of the questionable
validity of the bargaining positions, courts generally will grant relief to the creator if there is an ex-
press contractual provision granting an artist the right of integrity in the work. Id. at 19-20. Even if
the moral right terms were ambiguous in a contract, many courts still ruled in favor of the creator. Id.
at 20. Thus, the advantage of contract law is that it is the only common law cause of action that can
actually protect the right of integrity independent of the right of attribution, if the provision regarding
integrity is expressly provided. Damich, supra note 10, at 397. In other words, "under the American
copyright system, an artist who transfers a copy of his or her work to another may not, absent a
contractual agreement, prevent that person from destroying the copy or collect damages after the
fact." H.R. REP. No. 514, supra note 18, at 8. In addition, even if there is an agreement between an
artist and a purchaser stating some express right of integrity, the agreement may not bind subsequent
purchasers. Kwal, supra note 10, at 14.
22. It has been noted that
American creators typically are at a relative disadvantage compared to creators in moral
rights countries. The major difficulty facing American creators is the additional burden of
molding moral rights claims into other recognized causes of action... The moral right
doctrine is concerned with the creator's personality rights and society's interest in preserv-
ing the integrity of its culture. These interests are not the exclusive, or even the primary,
focus of any of the substitute theories, all of which developed in response to completely
different social concerns.
Kwall, supra note 10, at 23-24.
23. Damich, supra note 10, at 398.
24. Id. This is an extremely brief comment on the state moral rights statutes. For a more compre-
hensive understanding of the different state statutes, see Edward J. Damich, A Comparison of State
and Federal Moral Rights Protection: Are Artists Better Off After VARA?, 15 HASTINGs CoMMENT
W. 953 (1993).
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ly deemed moral rights important enough for specific statutory protection; and
courts have refused to extend moral rights causes of action through case law.'
As Rep. Robert Kastenmeier of Wisconsin, one of the congressional proponents
of moral rights, appropriately stated, "[W]hile our laws may be sufficient to
comply with Berne, this does not necessarily mean that they are sufficient for all
purposes."26 Therefore, through the concerted efforts of both Rep. Kastenmeier
and Rep. Edward Markey of Massachusetts, explicit federal legislation was final-
ly enacted to protect moral rights of American artists as envisioned by Article
6bis of the Berne Convention. This federal legislation, The Visual Artists Rights
Act of 1990, or simply VARA, brings the United States more closely into con-
formance with the Berne Convention and Article 6bis. It also provides a uniform
level of protection to those artists whose works fit within the protection of
VARA 7
II. THE VISUAL ARTISTS RIGHTS ACT OF 1990
With the enactment of VARA, Congress obviously recognized that works of
visual art are worthy of copyright protection as well as moral rights protection.
The paramount goals Congress sought to achieve by enacting VARA include: the
protection of the honor and reputations of visual artists, the preservation and
protection of the works of visual art themselves, and the provision of a nation-
wide standard for the protection of moral rights.' With legislation like VARA,
Congress wanted to encourage artists to create works of visual art, since the
cultural heritage of the nation can only be enhanced through the creation of such
art.29
As Rep. Markey stated, VARA "addresses this gap in copyright law by recog-
nizing that, as original expressions of the artists' creativity, works of visual fine
art embody intellectual property which can and should be protected by copyright
law."3 However, artists are afforded extremely limited protection under VARA,
since VARA protects only a narrow category of works under its definition of a
"work of visual art."'"
25. See Damich, supra note 10, at 387 (citing Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, 89
N.Y.S.2d 813 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1949) (where the right of an artist to protect his reputation "is not sup-
ported by the decisions of our courts") and Vargas v. Esquire, 164 F.2d 522, 526 (7th Cir. 1947),
cert. denied, 335 U.S. 813 (1948) (where the concept of moral rights "has not yet received accep-
tance into the law of the United States"). On the other hand, the court in Gilliam v. American Broad-
casting Co., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976) actually recognized moral rights as a separate cause of ac-
tion. However, no other court followed this lead. A more detailed interpretation of Gilliam can be
found in Kwall, supra note 10, at 34-36.
26. 136 CONG. REC. 12606, 12607 (1990).
27. One national policy is preferable to "a hodge-podge of state statutes." 136 CONG. REc., supra
note 9, at H8271.
28. 136 CoNG. REc. at 12608.
29. H.R. REP. No. 514, supra note 18, at 14.
30. 136 CONG. REC. at 12609.
31. 17 U.S.C. § 101 provides:
A "work of visual art" is-
[Vol. V: 187
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In fact, it was the intent of Congress to create a narrow definition of a "work
of visual art."32 Specifically, the works of visual art protected under VARA in-
clude irreplaceable works, such as paintings, drawings, prints, and sculptures.33
Although Congress wanted to extend moral rights protection to visual artists and
visual art, it did not want to interfere with other copyright owners' and users'
exercise of their rights under copyright law.34 As Rep. Fish of New York stated,
"[A]s a general proposition, so-called moral or artists rights, with their non[-]
economic, subjective underpinnings do not fit neatly within our copyright act."35
Thus, a narrow definition needed to be tailored to balance the inherently different
goals of the artists and the industry exploiting the art.
Powerful industry groups, including the motion picture, newspaper and maga-
zine industries, opposed moral rights.36 In general, these industry groups were
(1) a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy, in a limited edition
of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author, or, in
the case of a sculpture, in multiple cast, carved, or fabricated sculptures of 200 or fewer
that are consecutively numbered by the author and bear the signature or other identifying
mark of the author, or
(2) a still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only, existing in a single
copy that is signed by the author, or in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are
signed and consecutively numbered by the author.
32. Rep. Markey testified, "I would like to stress that we have gone to extreme lengths to very
narrowly define the works of art that will be covered... mhis legislation covers only a very select
group of artists." H.R. REP. No. 514, supra note 18, at 11. It was additionally noted in the legisla-
tive intent that
The courts should use common sense and generally accepted standards of the artistic com-
munity in determining whether a particular work falls within the scope of the definition.
Artists may work in a variety of media, and use any number of materials in creating their
works. Therefore, whether a particular work falls within the definition [of a "work of vi-
sual art"] should not depend on the medium or materials used.
Id.
33. VARA recognizes only single copies or limited editions of these protected works of visual art
because of the "special value inherent in the original or limited edition copy of a work of art." The
original and limited editions "embody the artist's 'personality' far more closely" than reproductions,
and consequently, "the original's loss deprives us of something uniquely valuable." See H.R. REP.
No. 514, supra note 18, at 12.
34. 136 CONG. REc. at 12608.
"[The] critical factual and legal differences in the way visual arts and [collaborative] audio-
visual works are created and disseminated have important practical consequences." H.R. REP. No.
514, supra note 18, at 9.
In fact, Congress was much more concerned with the works that are collaborative in nature,
such as films, than the irreplaceable works which tend to be the product of the creative efforts of a
single individual. Congress' concern with works collaborative in nature was greater because of the
great number of parties involved in the process of creating such works. The multiple number of peo-
ple involved made it more difficult to decide the fate of a project, because each party would have
their own specific goal regarding the work.
35. 136 CONG. REc. at 12610.
36. One motion picture industry representative believed "[m]oral rights legislation would be un-
necessary, unjustified, and an encumbrance on our ability to broadly distribute our copyrighted
works." A representative from the newspaper industry felt that the doctrine of moral rights was "not
compatible" with the newspaper industry. One publishing group believed that moral rights legislation
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concerned that the enactment of moral rights legislation would conflict with the
traditional ways in which these groups distributed and marketed their works."
Consequently, industry opposition convinced Congress to limit the subject matter
defining a "work of visual art."" Although this list of exclusions may be con-
sidered "overkill,"39 it was necessary since it reinforced the limited application
of the legislation.' Most importantly for Congress is that the limited scope of
the legislation "protects the legitimate interests of visual artists without inhibiting
the rights of copyright owners and users, and without undue interference with the
successful operation of the American copyright system."'" Although this initial
attempt at moral rights in the United States is narrow in its subject matter, it is
still a triumph due to the minor political clout of artists as compared to the great-
er power of those who exploit their works.42
The moral rights provided under VARA include the rights of attribution and
integrity." The right of attribution extends to an author the right to claim own-
would "alter the delicate balance of rights which is the foundation of our copyright system." See
Joshua Brown, Creators Caught in the Middle: Visual Artists Rights Act Preemption of State Moral
Rights Laws, 15 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 1003, 1011 (1993).
37. H.R. REP. No. 514, supra note 18, at 9.
As owners of the copyrights, these industry groups have traditionally controlled any alterations
to the works, and even accrued the pecuniary rewards relating to the works. However, the industry
groups feared that their creative control would be threatened by moral rights legislation, since the
concept of moral rights gives an artist, rather than the copyright owner, the ultimate control of grant-
ing any alterations to the particular work.
38. 17 U.S.C. § 101 provides:
A work of visual art does not include-
(A)(i) any poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram, model, applied art, mo-
tion picture or other audio-visual work, book, magazine, newspaper, periodical, data base,
electronic information service, electronic publication, or similar publication;
(ii) any merchandising item or advertised promotional, descriptive, covering, or packag-
ing material or container,
(iii) any portion or part of any item described in clause (i) or (ii);
(B) any work made for hire; or
(C) any work not subject to copyright protection under this title.
It is important to note, however, that pursuant to legislative intent, "a new and independent
work created from snippets of these materials [under the list of exclusions], such as a collage, is of
course not excluded [from the definition of a "work of visual art"]." H.R. REP. No. 514, supra note
18, at 14. This can help courts determine if a work does indeed fit within the definition of a "work of
visual art."
39. Peter H. Karlen, What's Wrong with VARA: A Critique of Federal Moral Rights, 15
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 905, 909 (1993).
40. The exclusions under 17 U.S.C. § 101, supra note 38, "are self-explanatory and reinforce the
premise of the bill to cover only those works described in the definition of a work of visual art and
therefore to protect only those works of art." H.R. REP. No. 514, supra note 18, at 13.
41. H.R. REP. No. 514, supra note 18, at 10.
42. Edward J. Damich, The Visual Rights of Act of 1990: Toward a Federal System of Moral
Rights Protection for Visual Art, 39 CATH. U.L. REV. 945, 947 (1990).
43. 17 U.S.C. § 106A provides:
(a) Rights of Attribution and Integrity - Subject to section 107 and independent of the
exclusive rights provided in section 106, the author of a work of visual art-
(1) shall have the right-
[Vol. V:187
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ership of a work,' to prevent his or her name from being attached to a work he
or she did not create,45 and to prevent his or her name from being attached to a
work that has been altered.'
The right of integrity can be divided into two separate prongs. The first prong
of the right of integrity extends to an author the right to prevent any intentional
distortion, mutilation, or modification of the work that is prejudicial to the
author's honor or reputation.47 It is important to stress two limits under this
prong of the right of integrity. First, any alteration to a work must be prejudicial
to an author's honor or reputation.' Second, the alteration must have been done
intentionally. In other words, an artist cannot prevent any negligent alterations of
a work.'
The second prong of the right of integrity allows an author to prevent the
destruction of a work of recognized stature. Some member states of the Berne
Convention believe that the destruction of a work does not qualify for protection
under the right of integrity because an artist's honor or reputation cannot be
harmed when there is no work in existence.5 According to the legislative histo-
ry, however, "[1]t is clear that the [Berne] Convention simply sets a floor for
protection and does not prohibit member countries from providing additional
rights. 52 In the United States' case, Congress felt that the destruction of a work
of art can be detrimental to both the artist and to society.53 Therefore, in cir-
cumstances where there is destruction, Congress has actually added more rights
(A) to claim authorship of that work, and
(B) to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of any work of visual art
which he or she did not create;
(2) shall have the right to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of the work
of visual art in the event of a distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work
which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation; and
(3) subject to the limitations set forth in section 113(d), shall have the right-
(A) to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that
work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation, and any intentional
distortion, mutilation, or modification of that work is a violation of that right, and
(B) to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized stature, and any intentional or
grossly negligent destruction of that work is a violation of that right.
44. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1)(A), supra note 43.
45. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1)(B), supra note 43.
46. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(2), supra note 43.
47. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A), supra note 43.
48. An author's "honor or reputation" focuses on "the artistic or professional honor or reputation
of the individual as embodied in the work that is protected. H.R. REP. No. 514, supra note 18, at 15
(emphasis added). In addition, "an author need not prove a pre-existing standing in the artistic com-
munity. The Committee appreciates that less well-known or appreciated artists also have honor and
reputations worthy of protection." Id.
49. One reason why a negligence standard is not applied in this section is because of the potential
for "accidental or inadvertent handling of artwork," which had some art traders concerned. Brown,
supra note 36, at 1022.
50. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B), supra note 43.
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than required by the Berne Convention by including this provision in VARA.
Since Congress is simply expanding the floor set by the Beme Convention, Con-
gress limits this particular right by stipulating that the only works of visual art
worthy of protection are those work of a particular caliber, specifically, one of
"recognized stature."54
Furthermore, this prong of the right of integrity, pertaining to the destruction
of a work, contains no mens rea requirement.5 Thus, the state of mind of the
party intending to do the destroying is irrelevant when an artist seeks to enjoin
this impending destruction. Again, the work must first qualify as "a work of
recognized stature" to merit moral rights protection. 6 On the other hand, in or-
der to receive damages, rather than just an injunction, the destruction that vio-
lates the artist's right of integrity must be "intentional" or "grossly negligent."
Thus, no damages may be sought until and unless the work of visual art has
actually been destroyed.
However, specific exceptions exist where the right of integrity is not violated.
If modification results from the passage of time or the inherent nature of the
materials, then the modification does not violate the right of integrity.58 More-
over, if modification of a work is the result of conservation or public presenta-
tion, including lighting and placement, then the modification does not affect the
right of integrity, unless it is caused by gross negligence
54. Even though Congress thought it was important for both society and artists to prevent the
destruction of a work, the "recognized stature" requirement does go against moral rights doctrine.
The fundamental basis of moral rights is that even "an insignificant, unappreciated work is no less an
expression of the artist's personality than is a work 'of recognized stature'." Damich, supra note 42,
at 955. Therefore, the quality criterion shifts the focus from one of moral rights, protecting an artist's
personality as it is embodied in the work, to one of simply preservation alone. Although preservation
is one goal of VARA, this protection alone is not sufficient to comport with the underlying rationale
behind a policy such as moral rights, where the artist's integrity should take precedence.
However, the requirement of recognized stature is beneficial because of the fact that it can bar
"nuisance lawsuits" by weeding out frivolous cases. Id. at 954 (This includes such examples as bar-
ring a five-year-old's finger-painting from suit, or barring suits against the destruction of works of
"amateurish or pedestrian character.").
55. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B), supra note 43 ("... prevent any destruction of a work of
recognized stature... ") (emphasis added).
56. Id.
57. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B), supra note 43 ("... and any intentional or grossly negligent
destruction of that work is a violation of that right") (emphasis added).
58. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(1) provides:
The modification of a work of visual art which is a result of the passage of time or the
inherent nature of the materials is not a distortion, mutilation, or other modification de-
scribed in subsection (a)(3)(a).
59. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(2) provides:
The modification of a work of visual art which is the result of conservation, or of the
public presentation, including lighting and placement, of the work is not a destruction,
distortion, mutilation, or other modification described in subsection (a)(3) unless the mod-
ification is caused by gross negligence.
Congress enacted this particular section of VARA to protect galleries and museums, so that the
members of these groups could continue to have discretion where to light and place a work of art.
H.R. REP. No. 514, supra note 18, at 17. However, to protect the artist, action will be taken against
[Vol. V: 187
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VARA also establishes special rules, at 17 U.S.C. § 113, concerning the re-
moval of works incorporated in buildings.' The relevance of 17 U.S.C. § 113
is that it distinguishes between a removable and non-removable work. A work
cannot be removed from a building if the removal would cause a modification of
the work as described in § 106A(a)(3).6 ' However, if the author and the build-
ing owner sign a written instrument specifying that the work would be destroyed
or modified in some way due to the installation of the work, then the author's
rights of integrity and paternity are not protected. Consequently, the building
owner may remove the work without any liability. The purpose of this additional
stipulation, requiring written consent, is to ensure that the author knowingly
allowed the work to be installed in the building, with the understanding that the
removal could potentially modify the work.62 This is simply one way to protect
building owners.
On the other hand, a work may be removed if the removal does not cause any
modification to the work that would harm the integrity of the work. However, an
author may still potentially lose his moral rights protection in such a case. That
is, if the owner made a good faith attempt to notify the author, or did in fact
provide notice, and the person notified failed to either remove the work or pay
for its removal within ninety days, then the building owner may remove the
work without liability.' In other words, if a building owner abides by these
aforementioned requirements, then an author cannot consequently sue the build-
these groups if something grossly negligent is done to the artist's work. Id.
60. 17 U.S.C. § 113 provides:
(d)(1) In a case in which-
(A) a work of visual art has been incorporated in or made part of a building in such a
way that removing the work from the building will cause the destruction, distortion, muti-
lation, or other modification of the work as described in section 106A(a)(3), and
(B) the author consented to the installation of the work in the building either before
the effective date set forth in section 610(a) of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, or in
a written instrument executed on or after such effective date that is signed by the owner of
the building and the author and that specifies that installation of the work may subject the
work to destruction, distortion, mutilation, or other modification, by reason of its removal,
then the rights conferred by paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 106A(a) shall not apply.
(2) If the owner of a building wishes to remove a work of visual art which is a part of
such building and which can be removed from the building without the destruction, distor-
tion, mutilation, or other modification of the work as described in section 106A(a)(3), the
author's rights under paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 106A(a) shall apply unless-
(A) the owner has ,made a diligent, good faith attempt without success to notify the
author of the owner's intended action affecting the work of visual art, or
(B) the owner did provide such notice in writing and the person so notified failed,
within 90 days after receiving such notice, either to remove the work or to pay for its
removal.
61. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3), supra note 43 ("... any intentional distortion, mutilation, or
other modification of that work which would be prejudicial to [the author's] honor or reputation...").
In this hypothetical, it is assumed that the work was installed after the effective date of VARA, since
a work created before the effective date is not protected under VARA. See discussion, infra notes 64
and 74.
62. H.R. REP. No. 514, supra note 18, at 20.
63. See 17 U.S.C. § I13(d)(2), supra note 60.
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ing owner for a violation of the author's rights of attribution and integrity.'
Another important issue regarding moral rights is whether the rights of attri-
bution and integrity can be transferred or waived. Under VARA, the rights of
attribution and integrity may be waived, but they may not be transferred.' Con-
gress allowed an artist to waive his moral rights because "these rights are per-
sonal to the author and that, because of a relatively weak economic position, the
author may be required to bargain away those rights." Although this may
weaken the impact of the legislation, Congress did not want to prohibit waivers
since they are part of "normal commercial practices." On the other hand, Con-
gress precludes an artist from transferring moral rights to a third party, because
the concept of transferring is "contrary to the personal nature" of moral rights.'
An artist choosing to waive his or her moral rights must follow specific rules
set forth in VARA.69 The author must expressly agree to waive his moral rights
in a signed written instrument. Moreover, this written instrument must specifical-
ly identify the work and the uses of the work to which the waiver applies. The
waiver will only apply to the work and uses identified in the written instrument.
If a work is prepared by two or more authors, the waiver of one author waives
the moral rights of all the authors.
A preemption provision is also contained in VARA. ° "A single Federal sys-
64. In addition, VARA rights do not extend to works of art installed in buildings before the effec-
tive date of VARA, June 1, 1990. Congressional reasoning not to include art already incorporated in
buildings was "to protect valid understandings of the law as it existed at the time of those installa-
tions." H.R. REP. No. 514, supra note 18, at 20.
65. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(1) provides:
The rights conferred by subsection (a) may not be transferred, but those rights may be
waived if the author expressly agrees to such waiver in a written instrument signed by the
author. Such instrument shall specifically identify the work, and uses of that work, to
which the waiver applies, and the waiver shall apply only to the work and uses so identi-
fied. In the case of a joint work prepared by two or more authors, a waiver of rights under
this paragraph made by one such author waives such rights for all such authors.
66. H.R. REP. No. 514, supra note 18, at 18.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 19.
69. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(1), supra note 65.
70. 17 U.S.C. § 301(0 provides:
(1) On or after the effective date set forth in section 610(a) of the Visual Artists Rights
Act of 1990, all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the rights conferred
by section 106A with respect to works of visual art to which the rights conferred by sec-
tion 106A apply are governed exclusively by section 106A and section 113(d) and the
provisions of this title relating to such sections. Thereafter, no person is entitled to any
such right or equivalent right in any work of visual art under the common law or statutes
of any State.
(2) Nothing in paragraph (1) annuls or limits any rights or remedies under the common
law or statutes of any State with respect to-
(A) any cause of action from undertakings commenced before the effective date set
forth in section 610(a) of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990;
(B) activities violating legal or equitable rights that are not equivalent to any of the
rights conferred by section 106A with respect to works of visual art; or
(C) activities violating legal or equitable rights which extend beyond the life of the
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tern is preferable to State statutes or municipal ordinances on moral rights be-
cause creativity is stimulated more effectively on a uniform, national basis."'7
Any state rights under statute or common law are preempted if they are equiva-
lent to VARA rights.72 However, VARA does not preempt any state statutory or
common law provisions that are not equivalent to the rights under VARA. 3
Moreover, any action filed prior to the enactment of VARA, June 1, 1991, is not
affected by the preemption provision.74
The moral rights extended under VARA are important in that they benefit
both the artist and society.' Artists are assured that they will be recognized for
the works they create, and that their works will be protected against any alter-
ations." The right of integrity "is the author's right to ensure that the work al-
ways authentically expresses his vision or concept."' Society also benefits since
the right of integrity preserves art for everyone to enjoy.7"
l. CARTER v. HELMSLEY-SPEAR
This Note next seeks to analyze the particular aspects of VARA through an
examination of Carter v. Helmsley Spear, Inc., the first interpretation of
VARA.
A. FACTS
Plaintiffs, John Carter, John Swing, and John Veronis are all professional
artists and sculptors who work as partners creating sculptures and other works of
art. One defendant, Helmsley-Spear, is the present managing agent of the build-
ing located at 47-44 31st Street in Queens, New York (hereinafter, "the Proper-
ty"), where the sculpture in question is located. The other defendant is 474431
Associates, the owner of the building.
On December 16, 1991, the plaintiffs contracted with Sig Management Com-
pany ("Sig"), the managing agent of the Property at the time the contract was
agreed upon. In this contract ("Contract"), the plaintiffs agreed "to design, create
author.
71. H.R. REP. No. 514, supra note 18, at 21.
72. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(f)(1), supra note 70.
73. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(f)(2)(B), supra note 70.
74. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(f)(2)(A), supra note 70.
In addition, under 610(a) of VARA, VARA was to take effect six months after the date of
enactment. Since VARA was enacted on December 1, 1990, the effective date of VARA is June 1,
1991. Thus, under 610(b) of VARA, only works created after June 1, 1991, may be protected under
VARA.
75. H.R. REP. No. 514, supra note 18, at 13.
76. Id. The term of moral rights protection under VARA lasts for the life of the author. 17 U.S.C
§ 106A(d)(1) provides that".., the rights conferred... shall endure for a term consisting of the life
of the author..."
77. Damich, supra note 42, at 949.
78. H.R. REP. No. 514, supra note 18, at 6 ("Artists in this country play a very important role in
capturing the essence of culture and recording it for future generations.").
79. 861 F. Supp. 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
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and install sculpture and other permanent installations" in the lobby ("Lobby") of
the Property. Although the plaintiffs had "full authority in design, color and
style" of the art work to be installed, Sig actually retained the authority to direct
the location of the installation within the Property. The Contract entitled the
plaintiffs to "receive design credit" as well as the ownership of the copyright of
their sculptures and installations. However, Sig was entitled to fifty percent of
the proceeds from any exploitation of the copyright. On January 20, 1993, Sig
and plaintiffs signed an agreement extending the Contract for an additional year.
On December 29, 1993, the plaintiffs extended the Contract again, however, this
time, with a new managing agent, Corporate Life.
After the defendant, Helmsley-Spear, became the new managing agent on
April 6, 1994, they ordered the plaintiffs to leave the Property, and told them
they would be considered trespassers if they returned. In addition, Helmsley-
Spear made statements to the plaintiffs that led them to believe that the defen-
dants intended to alter or remove the art work installed in the Lobby. Conse-
quently, the plaintiffs brought this action under VARA, seeking a permanent
injunction to prevent Helmsley-Spear from altering or destroying the art work in
the Lobby.
B. THE CARTER COURT'S OPINION AND ANALYSIS
1. "Work of Visual Art"
The court's initial inquiry was whether the work in the Lobby was actually a
"work of visual art." In determining whether the work was a work of visual art,
the court had to decide whether the sculptural installations in the Lobby consti-
tuted a single work of art or several discreet works of art that could be treated
separately under VARA. 0
The court concluded that the Work in the Lobby was indeed a single work of
art.' In reaching this conclusion, the court took several factors into account.
First, the plaintiffs themselves considered the Work to be a single work of art.
For example, plaintiff John Carter testified that "all of these pieces are interrelat-
ed and to remove one contaminates the meaning of the whole piece. It would be
like removing part of a painting or the hands from a portrait because we consider
this to be one work."" The judge also considered the testimonies of the other
plaintiffs as well as expert witnesses, all of whom concluded that the elements of
the Work were interrelated. Second, the court took into consideration the method
80. The court had to determine whether the Work was a single work or several discreet works,
due to the limitations set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 113(d), supra note 60. This result consequently helped
determine whether the Work itself could be removed from the Property.
81. In this particular case, it was important for the Carter court to conclude that the sculpture in
the Lobby was actually a single work of art. As a result, the massive sculpture could not be removed
from the building without causing some destruction, distortion, mutilation, or other modification to
the work. In addition, there was no signed written instrument between the parties. See 17 U.S.C. §
113(d)(1)(B); supra note 60. Thus, trying to move the sculpture would endanger the integrity of the
artist and the embodiment of the work that VARA seeks to protect.
82. Carter, 861 F. Supp. at 314.
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by which the plaintiffs created the Work. All three plaintiffs conferred to deter-
mine whether a new element would "work well"83 with the other elements.
They wanted to ensure that every element would "mesh together." 4 Third, the
various elements were interrelated rather than distinct pieces. The Work was
comprised of several structural elements that appeared to form an integrated
whole,85 and the court felt that the Work would lose its meaning if each piece
was viewed as an individual piece. Fourth, the Work had a consistent theme,
which was a recycling motif. Many of the materials and sculptural elements were
created from recycled matter. Finally, the court concluded that the Work was a
single work of art, after they went to the Property to inspect the Work for them-
selves.
The defendants also argued that the Work could not be protected under
VARA since the work incorporated elements of "applied art." The Carter court
defined applied art as "two- and three-dimensional ornamentation or decoration
that is affixed to otherwise utilitarian objects."86 Specifically, if a work is de-
fined as "applied art," it is explicitly excluded from protection under VARA. 7
The court concluded that the Work, whether its elements were examined
individually or as a whole, could not reasonably be described as applied art.
First, a sculptural element does not automatically become applied art simply
because the object to which it is attached is a utilitarian object. According to the
court, this result would render VARA "nonsensical," 8 since VARA protects
works of visual art permanently installed in buildings, and any part of a building
to which a work of visual art is affixed serves some utilitarian purpose. Second,
nothing in VARA proscribes protection of a work of visual art that simply incor-
porates elements of applied art. The court found that according to the legislative
history, Congress intended that a work of visual art can incorporate elements of
applied art. 9 Finally, the Carter court found that "the courts should use com-
mon sense and generally accepted standards of the artistic community in deter-
mining whether a particular work falls within scope of the definition"9° of
works of visual art. Therefore, the court held that the Work was not proscribed
VARA protection, since the Work as a whole was not "applied art."9'
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. One example cited by the court was a mosaic on the floor of the Lobby with words and
phrases that corresponded with elements on the ceiling and wall.
86. Carter, 861 F. Supp. at 315.
87. See definition of work of visual art in 17 U.S.C. § 101, supra note 38 ("A work of visual art
does not include-... applied art... ").
88. Carter, 861 F. Supp. at 315.
89. This result is pursuant to legislative history, where "a new and independent work created
from snippets of these materials [under the exclusions of 17 U.S.C. § 101, supra note 38], such as a
collage, is of course not excluded." Id. at 316 (citing H.R. REP. No. 514, supra note 18, at 14).
90. Id.
91. However, the court does specifically state that certain portions of the building were clearly
works of applied art. The strictly utilitarian works excluded from protection included: the building
directory, the entrance steps at 31st Street entrance, and the ceiling and wall lighting. Since these
1995]
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Furthermore, defendants argued that the Work was a "work made for hire." A
"work made for hire" is defined as "a work prepared by an employee within the
scope of his or her employment." A "work made for hire," like "applied art,"
is another specific exclusion from the definition of a "work of visual art."'
Since the "work made for hire" argument was raised, it had to be determined
whether the plaintiffs were employees, and if so, whether the Work was created
within the scope of their employment.
The Carter court relied on the recent Supreme Court decision of Community
for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,94 where the Supreme Court differentiated
between an "employee" and an "independent contractor" to determine whether a
work was a "work made for hire." 5 The Reid court lists a number of factors
relevant to a consideration of whether a hired party is in fact an employee or an
independent contractor.96 The Carter court relied on the Second Circuit case of
Aymes v. Bonelli,7 in order to elaborate on the weight accorded to the factors
that the Supreme Court set out in Reid. The Aymes court found five factors that
were deemed to be of particular universal relevance.9"
were "strictly" utilitarian objects, the court held that the items were not protected under VARA. Id.
92. 17 U.S.C. § 101 provides:
A "work made for hire" is-
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment; or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective
work, as part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supple-
mentary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a
test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by
them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire....
The Carter court automatically rejected the second prong of the definition, holding that is does
not apply to this case. Carter, 861 F. Supp. at 316.
93. See definition of work of visual art in 17 U.S.C. § 101, supra note 38 ("A work of visual art
does not include--.., any work made for hire ... .
94. 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
95. If the party is an employee, then the work is a work made for hire and receives no VARA
protection. However, if the party is deemed to be an independent contractor, that party will overcome
the work made for hire obstacle.
96. These factors, none of which alone is determinative, include: (1) the hiring party's right to
control the manner and means by which the product is created; (2) the level of skill necessary to cre-
ate the work; (3) the source of instrumentalities and tools; (4) the location of the work; (5) the dura-
tion of the relationship between the parties; (6) whether the hiring party has the right to assign addi-
tional projects to the hired party; (7) the extent of the hired party's discretion over when and how
long to work; (8) the method of payment; (9) the hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants;
(10) whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party; (11) whether the hiring party
is in business; (12) the provision of employee benefits; (13) the tax treatment of the hired party.
Carter, 861 F. Supp. at 316 (citing 490 U.S. at 751-52).
In addition, the factors were not intended to simply be tallied, but were to be weighed accord-
ing to their significance in the particular case at hand.
97. 980 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1992).
98. These five factors include: (1) the hiring party's right to control the manner and means of
creation; (2) the level of skill required; (3) the provision of benefits to the hired party; (4) the tax
treatment of the hired party; and (5) whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional pro-
jects to the hired party. Carter, 861 F. Supp. at 317 (citing Aymes, 980 F.2d at 861).
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The first critical factor in determining whether a hired party is an employee or
independent contractor is the hiring party's right to control the manner and
means of creation. The court found that the plaintiffs, the hired party, were inde-
pendent contractors for several reasons. Pursuant to the Contract, the plaintiffs
had "full authority in design, color and style" regarding the Work, whereas the
defendants, the hiring party, simply retained the authority to direct the location of
the Work within the Property. The court also took into consideration one of the
plaintiff's testimony where he stated that all three artists had complete artistic
freedom regarding the manner and means by which the Work was created." °
Although the plaintiffs adopted suggestions from others, this was in no way a
limitation on their artistic freedom. The court concluded that the plaintiffs main-
tained unfettered discretion in the creation of the Work, even if they adopted
some suggestions from other people.
The level of skill required is the second factor relevant to determine whether
the hired party is an employee or independent contractor. This factor was also
decided in the plaintiffs' favor as independent contractors. The plaintiffs were
professional artists and sculptors, and these have been recognized by several
courts as highly skilled occupations. The defendants argued that certain elements
of the Work did not require great skill to create, and that delegating certain work
cannot be considered as having great skill. However, the court found these argu-
ments without merit. Although the plaintiffs may have used some assistants, the
conception, creation, and execution of the Work remained in their control.
The third and fourth factors, regarding the provision of benefits to the hired
parties and the tax treatment of the hired parties, weighed in favor of the defen-
dants, especially since taxes were withheld during the entire period. However,
the court concluded that these two factors were not determinative to the defen-
dants because the plaintiffs continued working even after the provision of ben-
efits ceased.
The fifth and final critical factor is whether the hiring party had the right to
assign additional projects to the hired party. The court stated that a hired party is
more likely to be an independent contractor if hired to complete a specific
task.'0 ' In this case, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs because the only




100. Plaintiff Veronis testified that the plaintiffs were retained to "make sculptures and install them
in the lobby of the building. And it was our decision as to what these sculptures might look like and
might appear to be. And we were at liberties to create them and put them up throughout the lobby
area of the building." Id.
101. "Independent contractors are typically hired only for particular projects," whereas a party
hired to participate in several unspecified chores at the hiring party's discretion is likely to be an
employee. Id. at 319.
102. The Contract provided that the plaintiffs were hired "to design, create and install sculpture
and other permanent installations [on the Property] and to render such other related services and du-
ties as may be assigned to [them] from time to time." Id. The court held that even though the plain-
tiffs created art work on the Property other than the Lobby, this did not undermine the contention that
19951
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Three of the remaining factors also weighed in the plaintiffs' favor as inde-
pendent contractors. First, the duration of the relationship was only a finite term
of engagement 3 since the plaintiffs were not prior employees and would no
longer be employed upon completion of the work. Second, the extent of the hired
party's discretion over when and how long to work favored the plaintiffs as inde-
pendent contractors. The plaintiffs had no set hours, as well as twenty-four hour
access to the building, which gave them the option of working at the times of
their own choosing. In addition, they received the same pay whether they worked
over or under forty hours per week. The final factor weighing in favor of the
plaintiffs was whether the Work was the type of work created in the regular
course of the hiring party's business." 4 The court concluded that creating
works of visual art was not directly related to the "regular business" of the hiring
party.105
The court considered an additional factor in its determination of the plaintiffs'
work status: the ownership of the copyright. Under VARA, the purpose of the
"work made for hire" analysis is to determine whether a work created by the
hired party may be considered a "work of visual art."'" Thus, in an analysis of
"work made for hire," copyright ownership can help the court ascertain whether
the parties view their relationship as independent contractors or employees. Since
the Contract stipulated that the plaintiffs "shall retain copyrights"'" to the
Work, this factor alone helped the court demonstrate the plaintiffs' status as
they were hired solely to install art work on the Property.
The court also cited an example to suggest that neither the plaintiffs nor defendants viewed the
plaintiffs as employees. On one occasion, the plaintiffs were told to complete a chore in a different
building. Although they refused to complete this task, they were not terminated, penalized, or docked
in pay.
103. A finite term of engagement lasts for only the duration of a single project. This finite term of
engagement characterizes independent contractor status. Id. at 320.
104. "The purpose of this factor is to determine whether the hired party is performing tasks that
directly relate to the objective of the hiring party's business." Id. at 321.
105. Id.
The one factor which weighed in the defendant's favor was the method of payment. The plain-
tiffs were paid with weekly checks, typical of an employer-employee relationship.
Four factors were not helpful or were inconclusive as applied to this particular case. The source
of instrumentalities and tools was inconclusive since both parties provided such items. The location
of the Work was not helpful since the work could only be done at that particular Property. The hired
party's role in hiring and paying assistants was not helpful because although the plaintiffs selected all
paid and unpaid assistants (an indication of independent contractor status), the paid assistants could
not be hired without approval of the managing agent (indicating an employee relationship). Finally,
whether the hiring party was in business was not helpful and was given little weight. In fact, this
particular factor "will always have very little weight in this analysis." Id. (citing Aymes, 980 F.2d at
863).
106. On the other hand, under the Copyright Act of 1976, the purpose of determining whether a
hired party is an employee or independent contractor is to ascertain copyright ownership in a copy-
rightable work. In a situation pursuant to the Copyright Act of 1976, the court stated that in an inde-
pendent contractor relationship, the copyright belongs to the hired party. Conversely, an employer
owns the copyright in an employer-employee relationship, since the work that is created in the scope
of the employee's employment is for the employer's benefit. Id.
107. Id. at 322.
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independent contractors.
Therefore, the court concluded that the Work was not a "work made for hire"
in this case since the Reid factors weighed so greatly in favor of the plaintiffs as
independent contractors. This determination of plaintiffs as independent contrac-
tors was only strengthened by the fact that the plaintiffs owned the copyright of
the Work.
Thus, the court concluded that the Work was a single sculpture. In addition, it
found that the Work was actually a "work of visual art" by finding that it could
not fit into the exceptions of "applied art" or "work made for hire." Moreover,
the Work was created and installed after the effective date of VARA, June 1,
1991. (If the Work has been created before the effective date of VARA, the
plaintiffs' moral rights in the Work would not be protected under the law).
Since the Work fit the definition of a work of visual art, the court proceeded to
determine whether the right of integrity had actually been violated.
2. Prejudice to Honor or Reputation
In the first step of the right of integrity analysis, the court discussed whether
there was prejudice to the plaintiffs' honor or reputations. Pursuant to 17 U.S.C.
§ 106A(a), the author of a work of visual art has the right to "prevent any inten-
tional distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that work which would be
prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation, and any intentional distortion, muti-
lation, or modification of that work is a violation of that right..."'
In determining whether there was any honor or reputation which could be
prejudiced, the court began its analysis by defiming the terms "prejudicial," "hon-
or," and "reputation."'" According to the court, in cases involving the con-
struction of a statute, the language of the statute itself must be analyzed by look-
ing at the statute as a whole. The plain meaning of the language itself should
control, unless a literal application of the statute is at odds with the legislative
intent, in which case the legislative intent would control.
The court concluded that "prejudicial," "honor," and "reputation" all have
readily understood meanings that in no way run contrary to the purposes of
VARA. "Prejudice" was defined by the court as "injury or damage due to some
judgment of another;" 0 "honor" was defined as "good name or public es-
teem;"'' and "reputation" was defined as "the condition of being regarded as
worthy or meritorious."". Thus, in order to determine whether there was any
intentional distortion, mutilation, or modification of the Work that would be
prejudicial to the plaintiffs' honor or reputations, the Carter court considered
whether such alteration would cause injury or damage to plaintiffs' good name,
public esteem, or reputation in the artistic community.
108. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A), supra note 43.
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It is important to note that the court took into account legislative intent. Ac-
cording to the legislative intent, an author did not need to prove pre-existing s-
tanding in the artistic community." 3 Congress did not want a pre-existing stan-
ding standard so that unknown artists can be appreciated as having honor and
reputations that are worthy of moral rights protection. In addition, the determina-
tion of whether an action is prejudicial to an artist's honor or reputation focuses
on the "artistic or professional honor or reputation of the individual as it is em-
bodied in the work that is protected.""' 4 The court further stated that the for-
mulation must be flexible in order to determine the existence of any harm to
honor or reputation."5
In order to determine if such damage could occur to the plaintiffs' honor and
reputations, the court considered the testimony of expert witnesses, all of whom
testified that the honor and reputations of the author of the Work would in fact
be prejudiced. It is interesting to note that the court did not give the testimony of
the defense's expert witness much weight because that expert, an editor of an art
magazine, determined reputation based on his own subjective beliefs. In his
view, if he was not familiar with an artist, that artist did not have a reputation.
The court concluded that the plaintiffs' honor and reputations were, in fact, wor-
thy of protection under VARA.
3. Recognized Stature
The second step of the court's analysis regarding the right of integrity per-
tained to whether the Work can be defined as being of "recognized stature." The
emphasis of this particular section of VARA is on the destruction of a "work of
visual art." 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B) provides that the author of a work of
visual art shall have the right "to prevent any destruction of a work of recog-
nized stature, and any intentional or grossly negligent destruction of that work is
a violation of that right."'" 6 The court stated that the purpose of this section
was to prevent the significant societal loss that accompanies the destruction of a
work.' 17
Since the phrase "recognized stature" is not defined in VARA, the Carter
court looked to its plain meaning, interpreting the phrase in light of its goal --
preservation of art work. The court held that in order to be of recognized stature,
an artist must make a two-tiered showing.' First, a work of visual art must
have "stature,""' 9 such as being viewed as meritorious. Second, the stature must
113. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 514, supra note 18, at 15) ("[A]n author need not prove pre-existing
standing in the artistic community. The Committee appreciates that less well-known or appreciated
artists also have honor and reputations worthy of protection.").
114. Id. (emphasis added).
115. Id. ("The formulation for determining whether harm to honor or reputation exists must of
necessity be flexible.").
116. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B), supra note 43.
117. Carter, 861 F. Supp. at 324 (citing H.R. REp. No. 514, supra note 18, at 16).
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be "recognized"'2 by expert witnesses, including art experts, the art communi-
ty, or a cross section of society.' The Carter court found the Work to be of
recognized stature based on the testimony of expert witnesses. Based on the
experts' description of the Work," the court felt that the experts' interpretation
regarding the value and significance of the Work was sufficient to prove the
requisite stature requirement. The Carter court obviously felt that a substantial
amount of time was not necessary to conclude that a work has stature. Thus, the
Work was entitled protection under 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B).
4. Defendants' Constitutional Arguments
Next, the court considered the defendants' argument that VARA is an uncon-
stitutional violation of the Fifth Amendment, because it gave a third party the
right to control the use of defendants' own property. The court stated that the
defendants have a great burden because of the presumption that Congress passes
statutes that are constitutional. The court found the defendants' constitutional
arguments legally and factually without merit.
The defendants' first argument was based on whether VARA's protection of
the Work could actually be recognized as an impermissible regulatory taking."2
The Carter court relied on Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
City.'24 Four factors from the Penn Central case were considered in determin-
ing whether there was actually an impermissible regulatory taking in the case at
hand."z If these factors are satisfied, the argument against an impermissible
120. Id.
121. "A plaintiff need not demonstrate that his or her art work is equal in stature to that created by
artists such as Picasso, Chagall, or Giacometti." Id. In addition, the court added that "nor must the
trier of fact personally find the art to be aesthetically pleasing; indeed, courts have persistently
shunned the role of art critic." Id.
122. Some of the phrases used to describe the Work include, "an incredible phenomenon;" "a work
of art like nothing I've ever seen before;" "very much in the public interest of the City of New
York;" "noteworthy;" and "a very exciting piece." Id. at 325-26.
123. In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), the Supreme Court held that
"while property law may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recog-
nized as a taking." 260 U.S. at 415.
The Carter court found that "although no single test has been enunciated to ascertain whether a
given law or regulation constitutes an impermissible taking absent compensation, the jurisprudence
that has developed in this area sets the parameters of the inquiry and gives the Court significant
guidance in the instant case." Carter, 861 F. Supp. at 327.
124. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
A regulatory scheme known as New York City Landmarks Preservation Law (Landmarks Law)
was enacted by the City of New York to protect historical landmarks from being destroyed or funda-
mentally altered. The issue in the case was whether the particular Landmarks Law effected an imper-
missible taking. The Penn Central court held that the Landmarks Law did not effect an impermissible
taking.
125. The Penn Central court used four factors to determine that the Landmarks Law did not effect
an impermissible taking. The Landmarks Law: (1) implemented a comprehensive scheme designed to
further the public interest; (2) did not specifically or disproportionately burden the plaintiff; (3) left
much of the commercial value of the property intact and did not interfere with the plaintiff's primary
economic use of the property; and (4) included some reciprocity of benefits. Carter, 861 F. Supp. at
21
Iglendza: Moral Rights Protection Under the Visual Artists Rights Act of 19
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAUL J. ART & ENT. LAW
taking from occurring is strengthened."6
The first factor, whether the statute implements a comprehensive scheme
designed to further a public interest, was satisfied because VARA is a compre-
hensive scheme created by Congress to protect and preserve art for the sake of
public interest as well as artist's moral rights. The second factor, whether the
statute specifically or disproportionately burdens the plaintiff, was satisfied since
VARA only protects works installed after the effective date and permits VARA
rights to be waived. The third factor, whether much of the commercial value of
the property is intact and whether it interferes with the primary economic use of
the property, was also satisfied since VARA facially did not diminish property
value, and it did not deprive defendant's primary use of the Property, which was
leasing to tenants. The final factor, reciprocity of benefits, was satisfied since
artists benefit by having their works preserved in the form in which it was creat-
ed, and since the public benefits culturally through this preservation of art. Even
building owners benefit because art in the building generates public interest in
the property. Therefore, the satisfaction of the Penn Central factors shows there
was not an impermissible regulatory taking by the plaintiffs under VARA.
The defendants also argued that VARA allows an impermissible physical
taking by allowing third party plaintiffs to permanently occupy the defendants'
building. In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 7 the Supreme
Court held that "a permanent physical occupation authorized by the government
is a taking without regard to the public interests that it may serve."'" However,
the Carter court ruled that VARA did not permit a permanent physical occupa-
tion either on its face or as applied. On its face, VARA rights last for only a
limited time, the life of the author.29 Furthermore, VARA rights are not per-
manent since only art installed after the effective date is protected. 3 '
In addition, as applied to the facts of this case, VARA did not permit a per-
manent physical taking. Defendants' agents were all aware that the Work was
being installed, because it was easily noticeable and could not be overlooked by
anyone visiting the Property. Therefore, the court concluded that if Helmsley-
Spear, the present managing agent of the Property, believed that the former man-
aging agents' actions were impermissible, then Helmsley-Spear may file a suit
327 (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 133-35).
126. The Carter court also added the Penn Central court's emphasis that "not every law which
affects a property owner's right to control his property is a taking because 'government hardly could
go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every
such change in the general law'." Id. at 327 (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124).
127. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
128. Id. at 426.
"The permanence and absolute exclusivity of a physical occupation distinguish it from tem-
porary limitations on the right to exclude. Not every physical invasion is a taking.. . Memporary
limitations are subject to a much more complex balancing process to determine whether they are a
taking... [because] they do not absolutely dispossess the owner of his rights to use, and exclude
others from, his property. Id. at 435.
129. See text accompanying supra note 76.
130. See text accompanying supra note 74.
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for damages against them. However, no constitutional argument can help the
defendants to move or destroy the plaintiffs' Work.
5. The Scope of Protection and Relief in Carter
The Carter court first analyzed the injunctive relief available to the plain-
tiffs.'' In doing so, the court granted the plaintiffs an injunction prohibiting the
defendants from distorting, mutilating, or modifying the Work. In addition, plain-
tiffs were entitled to an injunction prohibiting defendants from destroying the
Work. However, no showing was made by the plaintiffs that would allow the
plaintiffs to complete the Work. The court held that although VARA protected
plaintiffs' visual art, it did not mandate any further creation in order to complete
the Work.'32
Next, the court analyzed whether damages could be recovered.' Since
plaintiffs have only shown that defendants intended to violate their VARA rights,
but that no VARA rights were actually violated, the plaintiffs were not entitled
to recover any actual or statutory damages.'34
Finally, the court analyzed whether costs and attorney's fees were appropri-
ate.'35 Since this court is the first district court in the country to interpret and
apply VARA, the court felt it would be inappropriate to award costs and attor-
ney's fees.'" In addition, the court found that since both parties vigorously
contested each other's claims, and since there was no direct precedence as guid-
131. 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) provides that "any court having jurisdiction of a civil action arising under
[the Copyright Act of 1976] may... grant temporary or final injunctions on such terms as it may
deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright." 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) includes
violations of an author's rights under 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) as actions infringing a copy-
right. In addition, the Carter court held that it had broad powers to issue an injunction when the need
dictated, and had great discretion in framing the terms of the injunction. Carter, 861 F. Supp. at 329.
132. The court found that the defendants' refusal to permit the plaintiffs from finishing the Work
was not a "distortion, mutilation, or modification" under 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A), supra note 43.
Carter, 861 F. Supp. at 329.
133. "When an infringement of the author's moral rights has been shown, the author may recover,
inter ala, either actual damages, 17 U.S.C. § 504(a) & (b), or at his or her election, statutory damag-
es, 17 U.S.C. § 504(a) & (c)" Id. at 329-330.
134. The court found that any alterations made the defendants or the defendants' agents were
quickly remedied. In addition, the plaintiffs failed to prove that the alterations were prejudicial to
their honor or reputations, or had the effect of destroying the Work.
135. 17 U.S.C. § 505 provides that "in any civil action under [the Copyright Act], the court in its
discretion may allow the recovery of full costs by or against the party.... Except as otherwise pro-
vided in [the Copyright Act], the court may also award a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing
party as part of the costs." Carter, 861 F. Supp. at 330.
Moreover, pursuant to 17 U.S.C. §§ 411 and 412, the work in question need not be registered
with the Register of Copyrights in order to have costs and attorney's fees awarded to the prevailing
party. Id.
136. However, the court does stipulate the proper rule for determining an award of costs and
attorney's fees by following the recent United States Supreme Court decision of Fogerty v. Fantasy,
Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1023 (1994). Exercising its own discretion, the factors the court may take into ac-
count include the frivolousness of the action, the motivation of the parties, the objective unreason-
ableness, and the need to advance considerations of compensation and deterrence. 114 S. Ct. at 1033.
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ance to interpret VARA, costs and fees would not be awarded.
CONCLUSION
VARA was created to protect an artist's moral rights, and the court's holding
in Carter validates the fact that VARA can actually protect artists. By ruling in
favor of the plaintiffs, the court reaffirmed the significant cultural and social
importance that art can embody for our nation as a whole. With its holding, the
Carter court became the first federal court to interpret VARA. Basing much of
its interpretation on legislative history, the court elaborated specific factors to be
used in determining whether a work could be protected under VARA. It is im-
portant, at least for this first "test" of VARA, that the effect of VARA can actu-
ally help save visual artists' moral rights by preserving the work of visual art
itself. This is an accomplishment never before achieved by a federal statute in
the United States.
The passage of VARA is a significant breakthrough for American artists.
Although VARA protects only a limited class of works, and is still much nar-
rower than the standards set forth in Article 6bis of the Berne Convention,
VARA's importance should not be underestimated. In time, as more courts inter-
pret VARA and its effects, any problems with VARA may be amended by Con-
gress as it sees fit. This will create an evolving, and possibly expanded, 37 form
of protection for artists in the future. Today, just the fact that Congress finally
chose to protect works of visual art as well as artists themselves puts art and
artists on a more appreciated level in the United States. A "work of visual art" is
no longer viewed as an ordinary piece of property under a traditional notion of
property rights, where ownership and economic control dictate the fate of the
work. Instead, an artist's work may now be protected from any alterations or
destruction even after it leaves the artist's hands, because the work is a reflection
of the artist's own personality. Simply because another person may own the
work of art, this does not give the owner the right to alter it in any way. Allow-
ing a work of art to remain in the form that it was created will not only allow
for the artist's own integrity and the integrity of the work to remain intact, but it
will give future generations an accurate picture of the lives of past generations.
Marko Iglendza
137. Rep. Fish of New York stated that "this legislation should not be viewed as a precedent for
the extension of so-called moral rights into other areas. This legislation addresses a very special sit-
uation in a very careful and deliberate way." 136 CONG. REC. at 12610.
If this statement is indicative of Congress' intent as a whole, then it would seem unlikely that
VARA will have any hope of expanding its scope of protection in the future.
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